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Abstract:
In some new political economic models, delays of stabilizations generally result from
some sort of coordination problem caused by the mechanisms of making collective
choices. Although several authors have tested the effects of political instability and
fragmentation on seigniorage, deficits, or inflation, no direct tests of the influence of
these factors on the timing of stabilizations have been undertaken. This is what I try to
accomplish here with the use of a duration model. Empirical results identify the degree of
fragmentation of the political system and the level of inflation as important determinants
of the timing of inflation stabilizations.
1A. INTRODUCTION
One intriguing fact that is common to many chronic inflation countries is that they
have followed potentially unsustainable policies for extended periods of time. These
policies include large budget deficits which lead to ever-growing debt to GDP ratios and
hyperinflation. Although these policies are recognized as suboptimal from a social
standpoint, the necessary (and welfare-improving) stabilizations are often delayed or not
fully implemented. Many economists explain these suboptimal policies by accusing
politicians of myopia or irrational behavior. Others argue that the countries lack the
expertise necessary to carry out the reforms or that they simply did nothing, expecting
things to get better by themselves or waiting for a big crisis that would force them to act.
Needless to say, these explanations are not very convincing. A new strand of
political economic literature has developed formal models that try to explain the adoption
of suboptimal policies by rational and forward looking agents that do the best they can in
the game being played.1 Most of them depart from the assumption of a social planner
choosing policies according to a social welfare function, and assume, instead, that policy
choices tend to be the result of negotiations between contending interest groups with
conflicting interests. Then, deviations from optimality are explained by coordination
problems caused by the mechanisms of making collective choices.
These models have several testable implications. Many of them focus on the
influence of political factors on the timing of stabilizations: fragmentation or polarization
of the political system; political instability; type of regime; political orientation of the
government; and time in office. Others are related to economic factors: intensity of the
crisis (level of inflation); or amount of foreign reserves available. Although several
2authors have tested the effects of political instability and fragmentation on seigniorage,
budget deficits, debt, or inflation [Cukierman, Edwards, and Tabellini (1992), Roubini
and Sachs (1989), and others], no direct tests of the influence of these factors on the
timing of stabilizations have been undertaken.
This is what I try to accomplish here. The influence of the above-mentioned
political and economic variables on the probability of starting a stabilization program is
evaluated with the help of a probit model. What increases that probability decreases the
duration of high inflation before the start of a stabilization program. This duration is
defined as the number of quarters since the onset of high inflation until the start of a
stabilization. Then, the empirical results are compared with the testable implications of
the theoretical models, so that we can discriminate among them. The second part of the
empirical analysis, more similar to the tests performed by most authors, deals with the
effects of political fragmentation and some economic variables on inflation across time
and countries (using an OLS model).
The paper is organized as follows. Section B presents a description of the recent
theories of delayed stabilization and reform. Testable implications of these theories are
discussed in section C, and the empirical analysis is described in section D. Finally, the
conclusions of this paper are presented in section E.
B. DELAYED STABILIZATION
1) Distributional conflict
Alesina and Drazen (1991) present a model in which delays of fiscal stabilization
result from the failure of rival interest groups to agree on a deficit reduction program.
3Until a consensus is reached the fiscal deficits are financed by external borrowing and
highly distortionary taxation (inflation tax), which is costly. Although the replacement of
distortionary taxation with an increase in less distortionary taxes is desirable, the two
groups involved are not able to agree on how the burden of higher taxation is going to be
distributed across them. Each group wishes to shift that burden onto the other group. This
situation leads to a “war of attrition” in which agreement on a stabilization program is
only reached when one of the groups concedes, that is, accepts paying a higher proportion
of the taxes in order to eliminate the deficit.
It is assumed that the welfare costs of distortionary taxation and the political costs
(of lobbying) differ across socioeconomic groups and that each group knows its own
costs but not those of its opponent. Thus, the loser, who suffers the highest costs of
maintaining the war, can not be identified from the outset, which gives each group a
rational incentive to wait and see if the opponent concedes first. Concession happens
when the marginal benefit of waiting equals the marginal benefit of conceding, that is,
when the expected gains of waiting another period equal the expected costs of doing so.
Several factors may lead to delays: more unequal distribution of the costs of
stabilization (lack of political cohesion or higher political fragmentation); lower costs of
delaying stabilization (smaller economic costs of inflation or smaller political costs);
greater dispersion of income across groups.
Drazen and Grilli (1993) extend the war of attrition model emphasizing the
possible benefits of economic crises. Since higher costs of delay hasten stabilizations (by
revealing the loser faster) an exogenous shock that aggravates the economic conditions
4may be welfare improving if the welfare costs of the shock are more than compensated
for by the benefits of earlier stabilization.
Laban and Sturzenegger (1994b) develop a model in which class conflicts
(between the rich and the poor) and adjustment costs lead to delays of stabilizations in the
context of the Latin American debt crisis. Stabilization means tax reform and expenditure
cuts. At the beginning of each period both groups decide whether or not to start a
stabilization program and how to distribute its costs. Until agreement is achieved, the
government finances the interest payments on its debt and transfers to the poor with
distortionary taxation (inflation tax). Since stabilization is costly the groups may prefer to
postpone it when inflation is low. In Laban and Sturzenegger (1994a) there is also ex post
payoff uncertainty and the two groups are assumed to be risk averse.
It is assumed that the rich make use of a financial adaptation technology which
allows them to hide part of their income from the inflation tax (through capital flight),
which is not available to the poor. As capital flight increases, the base for the
distortionary taxes diminishes and inflation has to increase in order to generate enough
receipts to finance the deficit, leading to higher welfare costs to the poor who can not
evade the inflation tax. As the relative situation of the poor gets worse, they will
eventually be willing to bear a disproportionate share of the adjustment costs (lower
transfers to them) and an agreement to stabilize will be reached. Several factors may
increase delays: higher costs of stabilization, lower costs of inflation, and lower costs of
financial adaptation.
Mondino, Sturzenegger, and Tommasi (1996) extend this framework by
incorporating the possibility of recurrent cycles of inflation and stabilization. They
5consider two pressure groups which request transfers from the government and whose
welfare increases with transfers and decreases with inflation. The government finances
these transfers by printing money, which results in higher inflation. Financial adaptation
is available to both groups, allowing them to avoid the inflation tax.
When inflation is low it may be worthwhile for the groups to request high
transfers. Since this results in higher inflation, both groups will resort to financial
adaptation which will increase inflation even more. Eventually, they will get to a high
level of inflation for which asking for big transfers is no longer optimal. Instead, they will
accept a stabilization that cuts subsidies, decreasing inflation and financial adaptation,
and leading to a remonetization of the economy. Back to the initial state of low inflation,
both groups will request higher transfers and the cycle just described will start again.
Successive cycles result in high average inflation, high variability of the inflation rate
over time, and stabilizations which are only temporarily successful (all commonly
observed in Latin American countries).
2) Uncertainty
Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) illustrate how a reform that would benefit a majority
of the population may be rejected by a majority of the electorate when the identity of
many gainers can not be determined ex ante. They examine the specific case of a trade
reform in a two-sector economy, where the removal of one tariff will increase wages in
the export sector (X) and lower them in the import-competing sector (Y). Workers in Y
can change to X incurring a cost. Some of them would be better off after the reform and
their move to X, but each worker does not know whether he will gain or lose because the
6cost of moving is not known ex ante. In this framework, individuals in X unconditionally
support the reform and those in Y will only do so if their expected benefit from reform is
positive. The approval of a reform is done through majority voting.
Even if a majority of the population (X workers plus those of Y that would win
with reform) would be better off, the reform may be rejected if Y workers are a majority
of the population and their expected benefit from reform is not positive. This result holds
with risk neutrality and is reinforced if we assume risk aversion. In a two period game,
there is a tendency towards the status quo. A reform rejected in the first period, even
when a majority would benefit from it, is not adopted in the second period because no
new information is revealed. But a reform adopted in the first period that ends up not
being beneficial to a majority of the population will be reversed in the second period.
Orphanides (1996) examines delay and abandonment of a stabilization program as
optimal decisions by a policymaker. He argues that it may be better to delay the program
if more favorable initial conditions are expected: either the adjustment may become less
painful, or political support may increase when the costs of inflation are fully recognized
by the public. Furthermore, after a plan is initiated, the policymaker may decide to
abandon it if the expected costs of concluding the program outweigh the expected
benefits. In a framework of an exchange rate based stabilization, where inflation is
reduced via the management of the exchange rate, the level of foreign reserves (subject to
stochastic shocks) will be a decisive factor. If this level is too low, the stabilization will
be delayed or abandoned.
The model explains those cases in which policymakers expect crises to be
transitory and prefer to stabilize when things get better. But it does not explain delays
7when the situation is only expected to get worse or why countries often fail to stabilize as
soon as favorable shocks occur. It also assumes that decisions are made by a policymaker
trying to maximize social utility or welfare, which in most cases (dictatorships excluded)
is not the way decisions are actually made. In democracies, decisions tend to be the result
of negotiations among contending parties or interest groups with conflicting interests.
3) Political Instability
Alesina and Tabellini (1989) present a model in which political instability and
polarization lead to overaccumulation of external debt, capital flight, and low domestic
investment. They consider two parties alternating in office, one representing the
“workers” and the other the “capitalists”, which attempt to redistribute income in favor of
their constituencies. When the incumbent party faces a small probability of reelection
there is an incentive to overaccumulate external debt, since it is able to allocate the
proceeds of the debt towards its constituency but does not internalize the costs of
servicing the debt, which will be faced by the next government. Higher debt leads also to
higher expected future taxes inducing capital flight and reducing investment, especially
when right-wing regimes are expected to collapse. Although not directly related to
stabilizations, their model shows how inefficient outcomes, sometimes related to delays
of stabilizations, can be generated by political instability and polarization.
Roubini and Sachs (1989) present evidence for OECD countries that higher
fragmentation (lower degree of cohesion) of the political system leads to higher public
debt. They find that high debt countries are usually parliamentary democracies with
highly proportional electoral systems that enable a large number of parties to be
8represented in Parliament and make one-party overall majorities difficult to obtain. This
generally results in coalition or minority governments and a low average tenure of
governments. As each member of a coalition holds veto power, and minority
governments can easily be turned down, agreements are harder to obtain and
stabilizations are delayed.
Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini (1992) present a political model of tax reforms
in which strategic considerations may induce the current government to leave an
inefficient tax system to its successors (in the presence of political instability and
polarization). In a framework along the lines of Alesina and Tabellini (1989), the lower
the probability of the current government being reappointed and the greater is
polarization, the more inefficient will be the tax system left for future governments. This
will limit their availability of funds and, therefore, decrease spending on areas that are not
favored by the incumbent policymaker. Thus, tax reform is delayed when the incumbent
faces small probability of reelection and high polarization.
They also show that after controlling for a set of structural variables, countries
with more unstable political systems tend to rely more on seigniorage.2 Their proxy of
political instability is the probability of government change, estimated in a probit model
that has economic performance indicators (inflation and growth), political events (riots,
coups, etc.), and structural variables (GDP per capita, democracy, etc.) as explanatory
variables. When included in the seigniorage regressions along with the structural
variables, this measure of political instability is always statistically significant.
Haggard and Kaufman (1992) argue that the security of governments and their
independence from the short-term distributive political pressures has great effects on the
9level and variability of inflation over the log-run. Political systems where military coups
and changes in regime abound, and the tenure of governments is short, tend to have
higher and more variable inflation than more stable regimes. They also found that
fragmented party systems or systems where some major parties are excluded from the
electoral game tend to lead to “bidding wars” among contending parties vying for
support, reinforcing the cleavages among them and making agreement on stabilization
policy more difficult.
They also argue that the capacity of different types of regimes to implement
successful stabilization plans depends on the political dynamics that underlie inflationary
pressures. In countries with a tradition of low or moderate inflation, stable democracies
and authoritarian regimes tend to fare equally well, but when inflation is very high,
authoritarian regimes have done a slightly better job. Democracies characterized by
fragmented party systems have the worst record, as the political instability they generate
tends to lead to higher inflation, and support for a stabilization program is difficult to
obtain.
C. TESTABLE IMPLICATIONS
Although most of the theoretical models referred to in the previous section deal
with stabilization as a reduction in the budget deficit or the ratio of public debt to GDP
(fiscal stabilization), their conclusions are also applicable to inflation stabilization, which
is the main focus of this paper. Furthermore, in most of the countries suffering from
chronic inflation large budget deficits lead to ever-growing debt to GDP ratios and
hyperinflation (through monetization), meaning that an inflation stabilization program
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can only succeed if it is accompanied by fiscal stabilization. Thus, the models above have
several testable implications that can be applied to inflation stabilization and that one
could try to confirm or deny with empirical data. They are presented below in four
categories.
1) Fragmentation of the political system
Roubini and Sachs (1989) showed that for industrial countries the degree of
fragmentation of the political system is directly related to the public debt. This is due to
the greater difficulty of parties to agree on the implementation of a stabilization in more
fragmented party systems. Since this article deals mainly with inflation, one could test the
related hypothesis that higher fragmentation leads to higher average inflation and delayed
stabilization, as Haggard and Kaufman (1992) suggest.
Since contending interest groups tend to be represented by political parties, the
multitude of parties represented in the parliaments of many fragmented party systems can
be associated with a high degree of political polarization of these systems3, which in the
models of  Alesina and Drazen (1991) and Cukierman, Edwards, and Tabellini (1992)
would also lead to greater delays of stabilizations.
This hypothesis would also be consistent with Alesina and Tabellini (1989) and
with Cukierman, Edwards, and Tabellini (1992) as higher fragmentation generally is
translated into an abundance of coalition governments leading to higher political
instability and shorter average tenure of governments. According to Alesina (1994), that
happens because each coalition member has the power of veto over things it may not like,
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which generates wars of attrition between coalition members, with stabilization being
delayed until the conflict is resolved.
2) Inflation rate
Drazen and Grilli (1993) suggest that crises, or higher costs of delay, hasten
stabilizations. Since the higher inflation is, the higher are the costs of delaying
stabilization, one should observe faster starting stabilizations as inflation gets higher
(assuming no efforts by the government to reduce the costs of inflation through
indexation or other means). This second testable hypothesis is consistent with most of the
models referred to above: in Laban and Sturzenegger (1994a and 1994b) higher inflation
worsens the relative bargaining position of the poor forcing them to accept conditions
they were not willing to accept before; in Mondino, Sturzenegger, and Tommasi (1996)
high inflation makes the request of further subsidies non-optimal; and it increases the
costs of delay in Alesina and Drazen (1991) and Orphanides (1996), leading also to
earlier stabilization.
3) Level of foreign reserves
Orphanides (1996) considers the level of foreign reserves as the main variable
influencing the decision of a policymaker to start or delay an exchange rate based
stabilization program. Thus, the higher the amount of reserves available, the smaller the
delay should be. This will be our third testable hypothesis.
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4) Others
Although the main purpose of the present paper is to test the models of the
previous section, it may be worthwhile to test some additional hypotheses: 4) stabilization
comes faster in authoritarian regimes than in democracies; 5) rightist governments are
more prone to stabilize than leftist ones; and, 6) governments tend to stabilize in the
beginning of their terms. The fourth builds on the discussion about the relative
advantages of both regimes [Haggard and Kaufman (1992) and Haggard and Webb
(1993)]; the fifth is related to the partisan model of Hibbs (1987), that suggests that
rightist parties care more about inflation that leftist parties; and the last with the
opportunistic political business cycle of Nordhaus (1975), in which a government
implements the toughest measures in the beginning of its term, when it still enjoys a large
public support.4
D. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
The first part of the empirical analysis consists of using a duration model to test
the above-mentioned hypotheses. Probit and proportional hazards specifications will be
estimated for a panel of 10 countries and 27 inflation stabilization programs in order to
determine which variables have a greater effect on the timing of stabilizations.
The second part of the empirical analysis, more similar to the tests performed by
most authors, deals with the effects of fragmentation of the political system on inflation
across time and countries. OLS regressions of the annual inflation rate on political
fragmentation and some economic variables are estimated for a panel of 10 countries
covering 40 years of observations (1957-1996) .
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1) The Data
The list of stabilization plans analyzed in this article is shown in Table 1. They are
the major programs generally referred to in the literature, which were able to reduce the
inflation rate considerably for some time and represented a “strong” willingness of the
incumbent government to reduce inflation, while some “minor” plans also implemented
in these countries were just vague attempts to do so with almost no probability of success.
The second column indicates the quarter in which the plans were implemented. The last
column indicates the number of quarters of high inflation that preceded the start of a
stabilization plan.5 Those stabilizations that were implemented when inflation was not
high according to my definition, have a duration of high inflation of zero quarters.
For each country, quarterly data was collected from the first quarter of 1957 (first
quarter for which quarterly data is available) until the fourth quarter of 1996. A
description of the variables used in this paper and their sources is presented in Table 2.
Quarterly data is not always available for some of the countries studied, but annual data
usually are. In order to make possible the inclusion of these data in the data set, straight-
line interpolation was used to generate quarterly data.6 The variables for which
interpolation was used (mainly for the 1950s, 1960s) are: real GDP; government deficit or
surplus as a percentage of the GDP; current account balance as a percentage of GDP; and
the unemployment rate. Even after interpolating annual data for these variables, there are
missing values for some of them, in particular the unemployment rate.
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2) The timing of stabilizations
In order to determine which factors influence the timing of an inflation
stabilization program, I use a binary probit model to estimate the effect of a set of
political and economic variables on the probability of starting a stabilization program in a
given quarter, when inflation is high. High inflation is defined as twice the average
inflation rate of the last 10 years (and greater than 25%) or greater or equal to 100%, and
only the quarters for which inflation is high and the quarter of implementation of a
stabilization plan are included in the data-set.
An individual inflation spell contains all the consecutive quarters in which
inflation was high according to my definition, until a stabilization plan started or inflation
ceased to be high. For each quarter and each inflation spell the dependent variable (STAB)
takes the value of one if a stabilization plan was implemented in that quarter, and zero if
it was implemented after that quarter. If no stabilization is implemented, STAB takes the
value of zero for all the observations in that inflation spell.
Three dummy variables based on Frag7, the degree of fragmentation of the
national government, were created: Frag=1, that takes the value of one when no political
parties are allowed or there is an exclusive one-party system, and zero otherwise;
Frag=2, that takes the value of one when there is a one-party majority government or a
presidential government with the same party in control of the parliament, and zero
otherwise; and Frag>2 that takes the value of one for the most fragmented political
systems, and zero otherwise.
Here I assume that the unobserved probability of starting a stabilization program
in a given quarter depends only on the following explanatory variables:
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Frag=1 and Frag=2: as explained above, they represent different degrees of political
fragmentation. According to Alesina and Drazen (1992) and Roubini and
Sachs (1989), a greater fragmentation of the government is expected to delay
stabilization. Thus, when these two dummies are included in a regression
(with Frag>2 left out) their estimated coefficients are expected to be positive,
and the one on Frag=1 is expected to be greater than the one on Frag=2;
F.Ind
8
: fragmentation index of the distribution of seats in the lower house of the
parliament. The proliferation of parties represented in parliament is expected
to lead to delays of stabilization. A negative estimated coefficient is expected;
Orient: political orientation of the government (from 1 to 4). The higher this variable
is the more to the left is the political orientation of the government. Thus it is
expected to be negatively related to the probability of starting a stabilization;9
Type: dummy variable that takes the value of one for authoritarian regimes and zero
for democracies. Expected to be positively related to the start of a stabilization
given the greater autonomy that authoritarian governments enjoy;
QLCH: number of quarters since last change in government or election. According to
the political business cycle literature (see Nordhaus, 1975) a government is
expected to implement tough measures earlier in its term;
Inf: annual inflation rate. According to Drazen and Grilli (1992) and Laban and
Sturzenegger (1994a,b) higher inflation is expected to hasten stabilizations;
TR/Imp: total foreign reserves as a percentage of imports. According to Orphanides
(1996), higher reserves hasten stabilizations;
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Other variables not so directly related to the models presented but that can influence the
outcome of a stabilization were used as controls:
GDS/GDP: government deficit or surplus as a percentage of GDP. Expected to be
positively related to the probability of starting a stabilization;
GDP: real GDP growth since same quarter of previous year. Expected to be positively
related to the probability of starting a stabilization;
Country dummies: a dummy variable was created for each of the ten countries. Then,
nine are included in the model to control for fixed effects.
Table 2 presents a more complete description of these variables and their sources. All
economic variables were lagged because the start of a stabilization program could affect
their contemporaneous values.
Results are reported on the first three columns of Table 3. Probit estimated
coefficients and estimates of the derivative of the probability of starting a stabilization in
a given quarter with respect to the independent variables are reported. The latter give the
effects of one-unit changes in the regressors on that probability (expressed in percentage
points), evaluated at the mean of the data. T-statistics for the null of no effect and the
associated p-values are also reported.
In column 1, Frag=1 and Frag=2 are statistically significant and the estimated
coefficients have the expected signs. Furthermore, the estimated coefficient of Frag=1 is
greater than that of Frag=2 as expected, supporting my first testable hypothesis that
higher fragmentation decreases the probability of starting a stabilization, that is, leads to
delays. The higher estimated coefficient and slope derivative of Frag=1 seems to indicate
that authoritarian regimes that did not allow political parties tend to stabilize faster.
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In the second column I use my other measure of fragmentation, F.Ind. Its
coefficient has the expected sign and is marginally significant (10% significance level),
providing some evidence that the proliferation of parties in the parliament leads to delays
of stabilizations. A one unit increase in the index decreases the probability of starting a
stabilization by 2.3 percentage points. Type10 has the wrong sign and is not statistically
significant, which goes against the hypothesis that authoritarian regimes in general tend to
stabilize faster. Thus, it seems that my fourth testable hypothesis that authoritarian
regimes tend to stabilize faster than in democracies is not supported in general (for all
authoritarian regimes) but, as mentioned above, authoritarian regimes that did not allow
political parties do seem to stabilize faster11, providing support for a restricted version of
the hypothesis.
In the third column, Frag=1 and Frag=2 were included in a single model with
F.Ind. For the two dummy variables, results are almost identical to those of column 1.
The only difference is that coefficients and slope derivatives are larger than before. F.Ind
is no longer statistically significant and has the wrong sign. Thus, when the two measures
of fragmentation are used at the same time, the dummy variables based on Frag seem to
work better that F.Ind.
Orient (orientation of the government) and QLCH (quarters since last change in
government or election) also have the expected signs but are only marginally significant
in the second estimation and not statistically significant in the others. Therefore, one finds
little or no support here for the hypotheses that rightist governments tend to stabilize
faster and that governments would tend to stabilize early in their terms.
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The first lag of the annual inflation rate (Inf(-1)) is always highly significant and
has a positive coefficient, supporting the hypothesis that stabilization comes faster as
inflation gets higher. A one percentage point increase in the annual inflation rate increases
the probability of starting a stabilization by .004 percentage points. Although it may seem
a very small slope, one should note that inflation was over 10,000 on a few occasions and
that its mean is 389.21 (means not reported here). TR/Imp(-1) has also a positive
coefficient, as expected, but is never significant, providing no support for Orphanides’
(1996) hypothesis that the decision on starting or postponing a stabilization depends upon
the available level of reserves. Although the ratio of total reserves to imports may not be a
perfect indicator of the amount of reserves available, it gives an idea of the capacity of
one nation to keep financing its imports, and is one of the best proxies available that can
be compared across countries of different sizes.
The control variables, GDS/GDP(-1) and GDP(-1), have the expected signs and
only the first lag of real GDP is usually significant. There was no evidence of country
fixed effects: the country dummies were usually not statistically significant individually
and one was never able to reject the null hypothesis that their coefficients were all equal
to zero.
I also performed a considerable number of robustness tests not reported here:
using quarterly inflation instead of annual inflation; using annual growth in money
instead of annual inflation; adding current account balance as a percentage of GDP,
growth in exports, growth in imports, change in total reserves, and the unemployment rate
to the list of explanatory variables (either one at a time or all at the same time). None of
these changed results significantly.
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Sensitivity analysis was performed estimating the specifications of Table 3 for
several alternative samples (results are not reported here). First, several alternative
definitions of high annual inflation were used: over twice the average inflation rate of the
last five years or greater than 100%; or, simply, above 50%, 75%, 100%, etc.. Second,
Israel and Turkey were excluded from the sample, so that one could verify if conclusions
hold when only Latin American countries are included. Then, Mexico and the Dominican
Republic were excluded, so that only South American countries would remain. Third, all
observations before 1970 were excluded. Since most of the problems with chronic
inflation started or became more severe in the 1970s, leading to the implementation of
stabilization programs in several countries, I check whether results are affected by
dropping the earlier stabilizations from the sample. Fourth, the stabilizations for which
duration of high inflation was zero were excluded, in order to keep only those starting
after a period of high inflation. results were virtually the same. In all cases, results did not
change considerably.
Probit with time dummies and Proportional Hazards
In the estimations described above I assumed that the probability of starting a
stabilization plan in a given quarter did not change autonomously over time, meaning that
any variation had to be due to changes in the explanatory variables. A simple way to
allow that probability to change over time even when the independent variables are held
constant, is to create a set of dummy variables accounting for the passage of time and
include them in the probit model. Seven time dummies reflecting the duration of high
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inflation before stabilization were created (each dummy reflects 4 quarters of high
inflation) and six were included in the list of independent variables.
Results are shown in columns 4 and 5 of Table 3 (page 35), which should be
compared with columns 1 and 2. Frag=1 and Frag=2 are now highly significant, F.Ind is
more significant than before, and their slope derivatives are larger than before. Inf(-1)
remains significant in both regressions, Orient, Type, QLCH, and TR/Imp(-1) are not
significant, GDP(-1) is only marginally significant in column 5, and GDS/GDP(-1) is
only marginally significant in the first estimation and significant at the 5% level in the
second. The time dummies were always jointly significant (coefficients on the dummies
are not reported). The introduction of year dummies in the regressions reinforced the
support for the hypothesis that higher fragmentation reduces the probability of starting a
stabilization, regardless of the measure used, and did not change considerably the support
found for most of the other testable hypotheses.
I also performed the same estimations using the discrete-time version of the
proportional hazards model developed by Prentice and Gloeckler (1978). Although in
practice results tend to be almost the same as those of probit estimations and probit
models are easier to estimate in most of the statistical software packages available, this
model may be theoretically more correct because, unlike the probit, its estimated
coefficients are the discrete-time equivalent of the underlying continuous-time model [see
Jenkins (1995)]. Given that similarity of results, only one estimation is reported in the last
column of Table 3, which should be compared with columns 1 and 4. Frag=1, Frag=2,
and Inf(-1) remain statistically significant, and the slope derivatives of the first two are
higher than for the probit models. None of the remaining explanatory variables is
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statistically significant. In short, results are not very different from those of the probit
model with or without time dummies, and the conclusions regarding the support for the
testable hypotheses remain the same.
3) Political fragmentation and inflation
The probit and proportional hazards estimations described above show that the
degree of fragmentation of the political system is one important determinant of the timing
of inflation stabilizations. Results over a panel of 10 countries and 27 stabilization
attempts clearly support the hypothesis that higher fragmentation leads to delays of
stabilizations (decrease the probability of starting a stabilization plan at a given quarter).
In this section, I will test the hypothesis that higher fragmentation of the political
system tends to lead to higher inflation. Again, I use two indicators of fragmentation: the
dummy variables based on Frag, the degree of fragmentation of the government; and
F.Ind, the Laakso and Taegepera (1979) measure of the effective number of parties in the
lower house of parliament.
The data-set consists of annual data covering 40 years (1957-1996) for the ten
countries considered in this paper.12 I estimate OLS regressions of annual inflation (Inf)
on an indicator of fragmentation (Frag=1 and Frag=2, or F.Ind) and on the following
economic variables: Inf(-1), GDS/GDP(-1), GDP(-1), and UR(-1). Estimated coefficients
are expected to be positive for F.Ind, GDP(-1), and UR(-1), and negative for Frag=1,
Frag=2, and GDS/GDP(-1). Country dummies were also included in the regressions in
order to control for fixed effects.13
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Results are reported in the first three columns of Table 4. As UR(-1) was not
statistically significant (column 1) and there are many missing values for unemployment
in my sample, it was excluded from the following regressions. F.Ind is highly significant
in the first two regressions and has the expected sign, supporting the hypothesis that
fragmentation, here equivalent to a higher effective number of parties, tends to lead to
higher inflation.14 Inf(-1) and GDS/GDP(-1) are always significant and have the expected
sign, expressing the influence of past inflation and budget balances on today’s inflation
rate. GDP(-1) is not statistically significant and has the wrong sign.
Frag=1 and Frag=2 are not statistically significant and the second has the wrong
sign (column 3). Thus, it seems that these dummy variables do not work as well as F.Ind
in the OLS regressions, while in the probits all were statistically significant.15 One could
also estimate a model using Frag as an explanatory variable, as Roubini and Sachs (1989)
do, instead of breaking it into dummies. The problem is that Frag has five categories of
fragmentation that are not necessarily equidistant from one another, that is, the increase in
fragmentation from Frag=1 to Frag=2 is not necessarily the same than from Frag=2 to
Frag=3. Furthermore, Frag=4 may not be equivalent to twice the fragmentation of when
Frag=2 or Frag=5 five times that of Frag=1. In short, the scale in this index and,
consequently, in the one used by Roubini and Sachs (1989) is not meaningful, and such a
variable should not be included in an OLS estimation. Instead, dummy variables for the
categories included in that index should be used.
In Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests not reported here the null hypothesis of unit
root behavior of the annual inflation rate could not be rejected for Chile and Mexico, and
it was rejected for Brazil and Israel only at the 10% significance level. Since
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nonstationarity of the inflation rate in these countries could affect the efficiency of the
estimators, I decided to reestimate the regression of column 2 with two restricted
samples: first, excluding Chile and Mexico (see column 4); second, excluding Brazil and
Israel as well (see column 5). Results did not change significantly, and one still finds
support for the hypothesis that higher fragmentation tends to lead to higher inflation.16
I also performed several robustness tests not reported here: adding current account
balance as a percentage of GDP, growth in exports, growth in imports, change in total
reserves, and total reserves as a percentage of imports to the list of regressors
(individually or all at the same time). None changed results significantly. Sensitivity
analysis, not reported here, was performed by using different samples: Latin American
countries only, and only observations since 1970. Again, results did not change
significantly.
E. CONCLUSIONS
A new strand of political economic literature tries to explain the delay of
stabilization programs by rational and forward looking agents that do the best they can in
the game being played. In these models, delays generally result from some sort of
coordination problem caused by the mechanisms of making collective choices. Although
several authors have tested the effects of political instability and fragmentation on
seigniorage, deficits, or inflation, no direct tests of the influence of those political factors
on the timing of stabilizations have been undertaken. That is accomplished here using a
duration model.
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Empirical results show that some political variables are important determinants of
the timing of stabilizations. Probit and proportional hazards estimations over a panel of
10 countries and 27 stabilization attempts clearly support the hypothesis that higher
fragmentation of the political system generally leads to delays of stabilizations. OLS
estimations covering 40 years of observations for the same 10 countries show that
fragmentation is directly related to inflation. Since higher fragmentation of the political
system tends to lead to higher polarization and political instability, these results are
consistent with the “war of attrition” model of Alesina and Drazen (1991) and with the
findings of Cukierman, Edwards, and Tabellini (1992) regarding the effect of political
instability on inflation.
Higher inflation seems to hasten stabilizations, as suggested by the “benefits of
crises” model of Drazen and Grilli (1993) and those of Laban and Sturzenegger
(1994a,b), and Mondino, Sturzenegger, and Tommasi (1996). There is also some support
for the hypothesis that authoritarian regimes hasten stabilizations, but evidence is found
only for those cases in which political parties are not allowed. Little or no evidence was
found of opportunistic business cycles or partisan effects. Finally, empirical results do not
support the model of Orphanides (1996) that bases the decision of starting or delaying a
stabilization program on the available amount of foreign reserves.
In short, it seems that the structure of the political system may help explain why
suboptimal (inflationary) policies are kept for long periods of time and the necessary
corrective actions are not taken. Countries whose electoral systems are highly
proportional tend to have a higher number of parties represented in parliament, generally
leading to higher political polarization and instability. Then, conflicts of interests between
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political parties make the approval of new legislation harder and stabilization programs
are often delayed until a serious crisis sets in.
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1 For surveys on this literature, see: Alesina (1994), Drazen (1996), Rodrik (1993), and Rodrik (1996).
2 Similar evidence regarding the effects of political instability on inflation and budget deficits is found by
Edwards and Tabellini (1991), and Roubini (1991).
3 Mainwaring and Scully (1995, p. 28-33) argue that the most polarized political systems in Latin America
are also the most fragmented. As the lack of political surveys in most of these countries does not allow us to
find data on polarization, the best proxy that can be found is the number of parties represented in parliament
(weighted by their relative size).
4 On political business cycle and partisan theories, see: Alesina (1994).
5 High inflation was defined as an annual inflation rate greater or equal to 100% or greater than twice the
average inflation rate of the last 10 years (and higher than 25%). Then, the duration of high inflation is
given by the number of consecutive quarters of high inflation until a stabilization program is implemented.
Later on, in the sensitivity analysis, alternative definitions of high inflation will be used.
6 The IFS CD-ROM does not have quarterly data for all the variables and all the countries considered for
the entire time period used here. For some countries only annual data is found on some variables or and,
sometimes, there is no data at all for earlier decades (1950s, 1960s, and in some cases, even for the 1970s).
Interpolation was also performed assuming the series were AR1 (auto-regressive or order 1) or RW1
(random walk of order 1). Results using any of these two alternatives were virtually equal to those obtained
when straight-line interpolation was used.
7 Values 2 to 5 of Frag correspond to the 4 degrees of fragmentation used by Roubini and Sachs (1989).
Since they were dealing with OECD democracies, there were no dictatorships in their sample. The same can
not be said about many countries in my sample. To account for this possibility, one more degree of
fragmentation was considered (“1- No parties allowed or exclusive one-party systems”). Since there were
no stabilizations being implemented when Frag was equal to 4 or 5, it was not possible to create dummy
variables for these cases and include them in the set of regressors, because they would totally predict the
value of the dependent variable (STAB=0). Thus, only three dumies were created (Frag=1; Frag=2; and
Frag>2), and the first two were included in the set of explanatory variables.
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8 F.Ind is the Laakso and Taegepera (1979) measure of the effective number of parties in Parliament with
parties being weighted according to their size (it is equal to zero when no parties are allowed). The greater
the index, the greater is the effective number of parties and fragmentation. According to Maiwaring and
Scully (1995, pp. 31) polarization or the “ideological distance tends to widen as the effective number of
parties increases.” Thus, F.Ind can also be used as a proxy for polarization of the party system.
9 According to the partisan business cycle of Hibbs (1977), leftist governments are more prone to inflation
than rightist governments. The classification used for this variable follows Haggard and Kaufman (1992).
10 This variable was not included in the estimation of column 1 because when Frag=1 takes the value of one
Type is also equal to one, resulting in high correlation of these variables (66.8%) which could lead to
problems of multicolinearity (the correlation matrix is not shown here).
11 One direct way of testing whether “strong” dictators tend to stabilize faster than “weak” dictators or not
would be to create a dummy variable representing the latter and include it in the estimation of column one,
so that its coefficient could be compared to that of Frag=1. Unfortunatelly that is not possible because in
my sample there is not a single case in which a  “weak” dictator implements an inflation stabilization
program, meaning that a dummy variable representing “weak” dictators would totally predict the value of
the dependent variable (STAB=0).
12 Here I use annual data instead of quarterly to avoid possible problems of using data generated by
interpolation for the three economic variables on the earlier decades. In the probit that was not an important
problem because there were few observations of earlier decades in the sample: there were not many quarters
for which inflation was high according to my definition, and there were only five stabilizations before 1970.
13 The first lags of GDS/GDP, GDP, and UR are used instead of their contemporaneous values because
inflation today may be better explained by last year’s deficit, GDP growth, and unemployment rate than by
the current ones. The optimal number of lags of the dependent and independent variables was determined
with the help of the Schwartz Bayesian Information Criterion (SBIC). In individual country estimations of
this specification Durbin h alternative tests reveal no evidence of autocorrelation.
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14 In country regressions not reported here 8 countries have a positive coefficient but, due to the low number
of observations, a maximum of 40 per country, most of the estimated coefficients were not statistically
significant (only 3 in 10).
15Besides grouping the categories in Frag into three dummies as done in column 3, I also grouped them into
five dummies (one per category). When the first four are included in a regression like that of column 3 none
of the dummy variables is statistically significant (results not reported here).
16In order to correct for problems of nonstationarity of the dependent variable in Chile, Mexico, Brazil, and
Israel I first-differenced the regression of column 2 and estimated it for a sample containing only those
countries. F.Ind was not statistically significant (results not reported here). That may be due to the fact that
there are few observations in that restricted sample, or that the relationship between fragmentation and
inflation is weaker for these countries than for the others.
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Table 1: Stabilization Programs
Country Program dates / names Duration of “high” inflation
until stabilization (quarters)
Argentina 1959.3 4
1967.2 0
1973.3 6
1978.4 (Tablita) 15
1985.1(Austral) 14
1990.1 (Bonex) 11
1991.2 (Convertibility) 1
Bolivia 1985.4 14
Brazil 1964:2 4
1986:1 (Cruzado) 22
1990.2 (Collor) 13
1994.3 (Real) 14
Chile 1975.2 11
1978.1 (Tablita) 0
Dominican Republic 1985.2 4
1991.2 13
Israel 1985.3 (Shekel) 27
Mexico 1976.4 0
1988.1 5
Peru 1981.3 22
1985.4 10
1990.3 11
Turkey 1980.1 12
Uruguay 1960.4 7
1968.2 11
1978.4 (Tablita) 0
1991.3 5
Sources: Bruno, et al. (1988), Bruno, et al. (1991), Calvo and Végh (1994),
Kiguel and Leviatan (1992), Pastor (1992), Hoffmaister and Végh
(1996), and Végh (1992).
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Table 2: Variables Used and Respective Sources
List of Variables Used: Sources:
Frag - Degree of fragmentation of the national government:
1 no parties allowed or exclusive one-party systems;
2 one-party majority parliamentary government; or
presidential government, with the same party in control
of the parliament (with an overall majority);
3 two-party coalition parliamentary government; or
presidential government with different parties in control
of the parliament;
4 coalition parliamentary government with 3 or more
coalition partners;
5 minority parliamentary government.
F.Ind - Fragmentation Index of the distribution of seats in the lower
house of the parliament:
F Ind
p
i
. Ζ

1
2
pi  = percentage of seats of party i.
Orient - Political orientation of the government:
1 conservative, antilabor, antileft government;
2 center-right government or coalition of center-right and
center-left parties;
3 center-left government;
4 socialist or populist government.
Type - Type of political system:
1 = m military dictatorship or authoritarian government
backed by the military;
0 = d democracy.
QLCH -  Quarters since last change in government or election
For all the political variables:
Arthur Banks, ed., Political
Handbook of the World, several
issues
Gorvin (1989)
Haggard and Kaufman (1992)
Dornbusch and Edwards (1991)
McDonald and Ruhl (1989):
Mainwaring and Scully (1995):
World Europa Yearbook,
Europa, several issues
Inf - Inflation Rate (growth in the CPI) IFS - IMF
TR/Imp - Total Reserves as a Percentage of Imports IFS - IMF
GDS/GDP - Government Deficit or Surplus as a Percentage of GDP IFS - IMF
GDP - Growth of Real GDP since same quarter of previous year IFS - IMF, IBGE, INEGI
CA/GDP - Current Account Balance as a Percentage of GDP IFS - IMF
Money - Growth of Money since same quarter of previous year IFS - IMF
Exp - Growth of Exports since same quarter of previous year IFS - IMF
Imp - Growth of Imports since same quarter of previous year IFS - IMF
UR - Unemployment Rate YNAS - UN, IBGE, INEGI
Notes: IFS - IMF = International Financial Statistics - International Monetary Fund
IBGE = Instituto Brazileiro de Geografia e Estatistica (Brazil)
INEGI = Instituto Nacional de Estatistica Geografia e Industria (Mexico)
YNAS - UN = Yearbook of National Account Statistics - United Nations
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Table 3: Probability of Starting a Stabilization Program
1 2 3 4 5 6
Frag = 1 .770395
(2.24)**
[10.2]
1.06589
(2.04)**
[14.2]
1.25084
(3.01)***
[14.9]
2.11016
(3.23)***
[18.4]
Frag = 2 .657210
(2.46)**
[8.76]
.783615
(2.47)**
[10.4]
1.08622
(3.17)***
[8.76]
1.71790
(2.42)**
[15.0]
F.Ind -.167725
(-1.77)*
[-2.30]
.080839
(.76)
[1.07]
-.217333
(-2.05)**
[-2.80]
Orient -.103821
(-.75)
[-1.38]
-.241049
(-1.67)*
[-3.30]
-.088329
(-.64)
[-1.17]
-.009741
(-.06)
[-.116]
-.186309
(-1.24)
[-2.40]
-.003327
(-.008)
[-.029]
Type -.477930
(-1.26)
[-6.55]
-.458327
(-1.18)
[-5.91]
QLCH -.032520
(-1.46)
[-.433]
-.041645
(-1.94)*
[-.571]
-.029257
(-1.29)
[-.389]
-.017580
(-.73)
[-.210]
-.035323
(-1.55)
[-.455]
-.037091
(-.62)
[-.324]
Inf (-1) .0003495
(3.23)***
[.004]
.000368
(3.31)***
[.005]
.000315
(2.68)***
[.004]
.0003048
(2.29)**
[.003]
.0003508
(2.66)***
[.004]
.000552
(2.49)**
[.004]
TR/Imp (-1) .022942
(.23)
[.306]
.040786
(.40)
[.559]
.008471
(.08)
[.112]
-.081004
(-.68)
[-.967]
-.007543
(-.06)
[-.097]
-.292980
(-1.01)
[-2.56]
GDS/GDP (-1) .037623
(1.41)
[.501]
.041413
(1.63)
[.568]
.036189
(1.36)
[.482]
.057008
(1.86)*
[.681]
.060660
(2.11)**
[.782]
.112706
(1.47)
[.984]
GDP (-1) .049490
(1.93)**
[.660]
.052013
(2.07)**
[.713]
.046771
(1.79)*
[.623]
.045363
(1.47)
[.541]
.053113
(1.83)*
[.684]
.062866
(1.08)
[.549]
Log of Likelihood -76.05 -78.36 -75.76 -68.12 -73.23 -67.83
McFadden R2 .1696 .1444 .1728 .2046 .2005 .3134
Number of Observ. 309 309 309 309 309 309
Sources:  see Table 2.
Notes: - t-statistics are in parentheses and Probit slope derivatives are in brackets;
- significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%;
- columns 1 to 3: probit model estimated with a constant, by Maximum Likelihood (ML);
- columns 4 and 5: probit model estimated with a constant and 6 time dummies, by ML;
- column 6: proportional hazards model estimated with a constant and 6 time dummies, by ML.
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Table 4: Political Fragmentation and Inflation
Entire Sample of 10 Countries Restricted Samples
1 2 3 4 5
F.Ind 105.021
(2.59)***
84.3630
(3.00)***
115.390
(3.28)***
99.1363
(2.23)**
Frag = 1 -87.0216
(-.74)
Frag = 2 108.042
(1.04)
Inf (-1) .126040
(1.86)*
.174480
(3.33)***
.202930
(3.92)***
.153130
(2.63)***
.1305737
(2.04)**
GDS/GDP (-1) -70.6943
(-4.92)***
-62.2120
(-5.95)***
-65.0663
(-6.13)***
-73.2357
(-5.86)***
-142.852
(-7.10)***
GDP (-1) -1.58429
(-.12)
-4.00200
(-.50)
-6.09153
(-.75)
-3.42316
(-.35)
6.12384
(.51)
UR (-1) 29.6901
(1.38)
Adjusted R2 .1898 .1869 .1696 .2038 .2556
Number of Observat. 220 350 350 285 213
Schwartz B. Inf. Crit. 13.89 13.36 13.40 13.54 13.70
Sources:  See Table 2.
Notes: - all the above models were estimated by OLS with a constant and nine country dummies
(to control for fixed effects);
- the dependent variable is the annual inflation rate (Inf);
- in column 4 Chile and Mexico were excluded from the sample;
- in column 5 Chile, Mexico, Brazil, and Israel were excluded from the sample;
- t-statistics are in parentheses;
- the number of stars reveals the significance level at which the relevant null hypothesis
is rejected: *** for 1%, ** for 5%, and * for 10%.
